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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

BISHOP BERKELEY AND HIS MESSAGE

TWO hundred years ago there landed on American shores George Berkeley; a man whose publications, while he was yet in the twenties, had placed him among the world's first philosophers; a man so charming and so admirable in human relations that men as pessimistic of human nature and as caustic in their expression as Dean Swift and Alexander Pope could say nothing but good of him; a man so generous in his enthusiasms that he could resign what was at the time a princely preferment of the Church to accept the position of headship of a College which he hoped to found in the Bermudas at the yearly salary of a hundred pounds, and a man so unpractical in his enthusiasms as to believe that he would find human nature fresh and unspoiled in the North American Indian and could train it into perfection in the College in the Bermuda Islands, from which should go out missionaries of light and virtue to all the Indians of the American continents, and to believe that in Tar Water he had found a panacea for all human diseases.

He put into verse his hopes, verses which should certainly be read on this occasion:

VERSES ON THE PROSPECT OF PLANTING ARTS AND SCIENCES IN AMERICA

The muse disgusted at an age and clime
  Barren of every glorious theme,
In distant lands now waits a better time
  Producing subjects worthy fame.

In happier climes where from the genial sun
  And virgin earth such scenes ensue
The force of art by nature seems outdone,
  And fancied beauties by the true.

In happy climes, the scene of innocence,
  Where nature guides and virtue rules,
Where men shall not impose for truth and sense
  The pedantry of courts and schools;

There shall be sung another golden age,
  The rise of Empire and the arts
The good and great inspiring epic sage,
  The wisest heads and noblest hearts.

[1] An address delivered on the 200th anniversary of the landing of Bishop Berkeley in this country, at a joint celebration by the University of California and the City of Berkeley, January 23, 1929.

Not such as Europe breeds in her decay;
Such as she bred when fresh and young,
When heavenly flame did animate her clay,
By future poets shall be sung.

Westward the course of empire takes its way;
The four first acts already past,
A fifth shall close the drama with the day;
Time's noblest offspring is the last.

The twenty thousand pounds which Parliament had voted for Berkeley's Bermuda College never reached him, though he waited for it five years in Newport, Rhode Island. It was spent for other purposes by an unidealistic Prime Minister. One might speculate on what would have been Berkeley's disappointments upon the inevitable bursting of this South Sea bubble, if the appropriation had been put into his hands, but it is better to congratulate him upon this minor disappointment, which left his enthusiasm still vivid and uncrushed, and that his name has in the course of time been associated with a great American University which, though so distant from the Bermudas, does embody his hopes and aspirations.

It is better to consider what there is more than fortunate chance in the association of the name of the great Bishop with this place and hence with the University of which it is the geographical locus. This means disentangling the purport of Berkeley's philosophy from the current ideas and language of his own time, and clothing the message he was so profoundly eager to proclaim in our own ideas and vernacular. For Berkeley had a message which ran through the thought and writings of all his years, for which the ideology of his earlier years and the Neo-Platonism of latter years, the scheme for his Bermuda College, and his advertisements of Tar Water were but the carriers, largely dictated by his own times.

Berkeley belonged to the eighteenth century, the eighteenth century of England, the century of Addison and the *Spectator,* of Steele and his *Sentimental Journey,* of Samuel Johnson and his *Rasselas,* of Alexander Pope and *The Rape of the Lock,* of Dean Swift and *Gulliver's Travels,* of Butler's *Analogy,* of Isaac Newton and his *Principia* and his *Fluxions,* of Mandeville and his *Fable of the Bees,* of Shaftesbury and his *Characteristics,* of Mathew Tindal and his *The Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature,* of Defoe and *Robinson Crusoe,* of Richardson, Smollett, and Fielding, of the Free Thinkers, the Rakes, and Beau Brummel, and of John Locke's *New Way of Ideas.* It was an age in which corruption was systematized into a political system, and public pilfering was a profession. In all this medley there was a common characteristic, a fastening on what was there, an intrenchment in the given, a determination to enjoy what was within the reach of the eyes and the ears

and the hands, a distrust of theories, and a wary avoidance of critical issues. England had gone through a revolution and had succeeded in avoiding a civil war. She was rid of the regiment of the Puritan Saints and the autocracy of the Stuart dynasty. She had muddled through to an illogical dominance of Parliament, and profoundly distrusted all high-flown loyalties. It was an age of materialism, if we mean by materialism a concentrated interest in what we have and a determination not to sacrifice it to any theories, however logical.

And Berkeley, the youthful philosopher, was more thoroughgoing in restricting reality to what we get through direct experience than was John Locke, along whose *New Way of Ideas* Berkeley travelled; and he was more logical. Locke said that all our knowledge was of our sensations—he called them ideas—and the impressions of the mind's inner activities; but he admitted that our sensations of solid extension gave to us experience of an external extended matter. To this Berkeley replied that our sensations of touch and contact are in the same boat with the sensations of color and odor and sound and warmth. They are just our sensations. Their reality is just our sensing of them. *Esse est percipi.* It is all very simple. The world is after all only what we experience and we experience only our sensations. So far this is sound eighteenth-century materialism, but it is not eighteenth-century common-sense. It was too logical to appeal to the English mind. Dr. Johnson refuted this Berkeleyan idealism by stamping on the ground. He entirely agreed with John Locke that we had experience of external solid matter, not simply experience of our own sensations of extended hardness. Of course, Berkeley could ask, in reply, what more there could be in experiencing outside matter than having sensations of hardness and of extension, provided one always experienced the sensation when he had the visual sensation of it, and anyone who had travelled along Locke's new way of ideas was hard put to it to find any difference. If he stubbed his toe the painful sensation of extended hardness was all there was to it. Externality was only another phase of sensation and it was a sensation of the individual, and lay in his mind quite as much as colors or sounds or odors. What indeed did call for explanation was the regularity of these physical sensations. The mind was not responsible for their happening, even if they did happen to the mind. The mind was passive over against them. It was a common-sense answer to say that the cause of them was a world outside of mind. It was regular, uniform in its operations, and thus accounted for the occurrence of the sensations. Now, Dr. Johnson was as pious as was Bishop Berkeley and believed as profoundly as did the Bishop that the

physical world, if it existed, must be itself the effect of divine creation and control. If he went along the way of ideas, Berkeley could ask him why he should introduce this unnecessary world? The ultimate cause was the action of God. Why, then, should God create a world to produce a sensation of external matter, when he could so much more simply cause immediately this sensation of external matter in men's minds? It was not only unnecessary, a fifth wheel in the universe, but it introduced further incomprehensibilities. How can an external matter affect a spiritual mind? We know, from our experience, that our minds can affect themselves. Every action of the will in directing our thoughts and actions is evidence of this. There is, then, no difficulty in believing that God, who is an all-powerful spirit, can produce any effects he chooses in the minds of his creatures, who are also spirits, but to assume that God creates something that is not mind to act on our minds, is not only to assume a superfluity, but assume something which we can not understand. Assume, for the sake of argument, that God has created a physical world to produce these hard, colorful, sounding sensations in our minds, and that his intelligent direction sees to it that this matter always uniformly produces these sensations. Now again, let us assume that he annihilates this world, that lies between him and his creatures, and that he directly produces in these minds these same sensations; should we ever know it? Could we ever know it, unless God saw fit to make a revelation of what he had done? If you start with Berkeley along this new way of ideas there is no point at which you can stop him. No, the only way in which to bring Berkeley to a pause along this new way of ideas, was to follow it just a little further, as David Hume did, and ask the further question, How by following associations within our minds can we get to the existence of a God outside of our minds? For, after all, the idea of causation, along this new way of ideas, is only an association of ideas and memories within the mind. And with this step one reaches complete skepticism. One wonders what the logical Berkeley would have done if this logical step had occurred to him. But this step belonged to the next generation and does not concern Berkeley.

But until this further step was taken along the way of John Locke's ideas, Berkeley was entirely logical. There was no material universe to stand between him and his God, the cause, the creator, and the ruler of a spiritual universe. By being consistent in the presuppositions of a materialistic age, Berkeley swept the whole material universe away. The order and structure of our sensations was but the language by which God conversed with us, indicating to us what experiences we were to expect. Berkeley analysed

with exquisite neatness our visual sensations into the symbols which God imprints on our minds of the tactual sensations we shall have if we move in certain ways. His *Theory of Vision* is as convincing today as it was when it was written, though we interpret it behavioristically rather than theologically. Perhaps I can illustrate what Berkeley's philosophy undertook to do by an economist's fable. Unlike Berkeley, the economist was not entirely orthodox. But this was the fable he told his class, who were studying banking and the gold reserve. A certain bank had its gold reserve stored in its vaults. The bank issued its paper according to legal ratio, and remained therefore entirely sound. No one wanted the gold as long as he knew he could get it. But one day it was discovered that a burglar had burrowed under the vault and into it, and had carried the whole gold reserve away. The directors met and adjourned without deciding what steps to take. This indecision lasted for some time, while the banking business went on, no one else being the wiser and therefore no one else caring at all whether there was any gold reserve or not. It is not necessary to consider the later action of the bank directors, but I think the application is evident. Here we move about in the world of our sensations, with their extension and solidity. Our distance sensations indicate to us what we must do to attain contact sensations, but we never get away from sensations, we only pass from certain sensations to other sensations, and they are all of them ordered in a law-abiding world of sensations. To be sure, we assume there are physical things answering to these sensations, but our only interest in them is our belief that they insure our getting other experiences if we act intelligently. Now comes Berkeley the burglar, burrows underneath our presuppositions and takes the material universe away, and lo! all goes on as before. The same divine intelligence that was supposed to have created this physical universe is directly responsible for the meanings which our experiences have for us, and we never discover that the physical backing of our ideas is gone. And, unlike the bank directors, we discover that we have no way of finding out whether it is gone or not, because we never could experience it anyway; all we could get would be some more sensations.

Berkeley walked with God even more intimately than Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, and "The fruit of that forbidden tree whose mortal taste brought death into the world and all our woe," had left him in constant converse with his Maker, not only in hours of meditation and worship, but in every glance of the eye and in every contact of foot or hand. He possessed a proof of God's existence before which Paley's watch slinks away abashed. Read it in *Alciphron* and wonder,—that is, until the specter of David Hume rises above

the northern horizon. He had turned the flank of materialism by carrying the tenets of its philosophy to their logical conclusion. But when he undertook to convince the Free Thinkers and libertines of his generation, he had to confess that their unbelief was not an affair of the reason, but of the will, and their untoward impulses. And, after all, the doctrine suffered for practical purposes by its own virtuosity. Even if we find that we have been unnecessarily assuming a physical world outside of experience, we can go on doing so without in any way interfering with our conduct. We are, most of us, Dr. Johnsons rather than Berkeleys, we stamp our feet heartily on the pavement and thus dissipate the subtle vapors of the brain. *Alciphron* probably had less effect than Butler's *Analogy,* they both being written in the same attempt, to meet the ratiocinations of the Free Thinkers.

Berkeley's important philosophical treatises were written with astonishing precocity in his early years, and he had given them a more popular form in dialogues beautifully fashioned. The *Alciphron* he wrote while at Newport, Rhode Island, and took it back with him for publication. The Bishopric of Cloyne in Ireland was conferred upon him, and there he spent his later years in the most admirable execution of his office. He, in some degree, confessed the inadequacy of his doctrine as a final philosophy by wandering into the field of Neo-Platonism in later life. He got out of the New Way of Ideas. But he brought back with him from America tar-impregnated water, a harmless panacea for all ailments, which he supported by learned quotations from the ancients, and mingled with his later writings.

We may leave Berkeley's treatises to their secure place among the classics of the world's philosophies, but we have still the task of lifting his undertaking out of the vernacular and current conceptions of his time and restating it in terms of our own way of ideas. What Berkeley said was that our experiences, as we live them in our inner and outer lives, are parts of the reality that stretches out infinitely beyond us. They are the same stuff and have the same inner nature. For Berkeley that which stretched out beyond, was the God whom he conceived in the terms of the theology of his time and his church. We may not conceive it in these terms. But however we conceive that reality, our experience may be continuous with it. All the world that is revealed to our senses in our imagination and thought may be the very stuff of reality, the perspective of the universe that appears in the experience of each one of us, and in each moment of that experience may be an integral part of the world which science presents. In other words, Berkeley's message was this: that the nature of our experience is the same as the

nature of the universe that is responsible for it. It makes short work of Descartes' dualism of mind and matter, by abrogating matter. Berkeley annihilated matter, but he left the entire reality of the material world in the mind of God and in our minds, as God produces there the impressions which are the world of our experience. Hume, travelling still more logically along the way of Locke's ideas, wiped out any knowable connection between these impressions and anything outside of them, and wiped out the mind also as a spiritual substance. In the face of this debacle, men, such as James and John Stuart Mill, who still travelled along Locke's way of ideas, reverted, in practice, to Dr. Johnson's common-sense attitude. The physical world was assumed to be there, in some way paralleling our sensations and ideas. The dualism of Descartes was reëstablished, and materialism flourished. But it was a different materialism from that which Berkeley fought. It was the materialism of the extraordinary growth of recent physical science.

Now theoretically, science might have accepted Berkeley's doctrine, and have gone on investigating the universe as it lay in the mind of God, but if it had done so it would have accepted also the trammels of Berkeley's theological metaphysics. Science must be free to accept the physical world without any presupposition as to the purposes of a Creator. Berkeley, in the *Alciphron,* was as really undertaking to justify the ways of God to men as was Milton, and made man the center of creation. Science can give no preferred position to mankind in its universe, not even to solve the epistemological problem. So we witness the extraordinary and stately structure of nineteenth-century science, that was entirely indifferent to any philosophical problems involved in our experience or in our experiencing. Newtonian mechanics triumphed, with Newton's dictum, *Non Fingo Hypotheses,* which did not mean, I do not make hypotheses, but that I do not make any theoretical presuppositions.

If it was wisdom to leave the sciences free to go their own way and to follow their own method, wisdom has certainly been justified of her children. For not only have the sciences flourished mightily, maintaining inviolate the experimental method, but the world which they have made has evidenced notable progress in filling in the Cartesian chasm between matter and mind. In the nineteenth century this approach of matter to mind, was found in the biological sciences. Fixed species disappear and we see them arise in the struggle for existence and in physiological mutations. Thus we witness not only the origin of the human species, but also the evolution of intelligence. We can not put living and intelligent organisms into the realm of nature, and watch their develop-

ment in accordance with natural law, without putting there also the purposiveness of life and the intelligent attainment of the ends of the living organisms. But while the demand is inevitably made, it seems impossible to gear it up with the Newtonian mechanics of the physical sciences. However, it must be noted that the problem now lies in the scientific world. It is no offensive projection of philosophic speculation. And then psychology enrolls itself among the natural sciences, and accepts its experimental method and struggles to free itself from its philosophic inheritances. It has been chiefly occupied in trying so to state our experiences that they can retain their concrete content and still become data for scientific observation and experiment. The conflicts between parallelism and interactionism, between structural, functional, objective, and behavioristic psychologies all turn upon what it is that we actually observe and can make the subject-matter of our experiments. The psychologists are agreed that they will be scientific, and that they will bring with them no metaphysical presuppositions. What they are not agreed upon is the identification of what they observe. Mind, the psychologist has brought within the method and scope of science. If the bifurcation of nature into mind and matter persists, that bifurcation lies within the field of science. Philosophy is not responsible for it.

In the twentieth century the physicists made the extraordinary discovery that if exact measurements were to be made, it was necessary to take into account the relative motion of the measurer and that which is measured; that as this varies the actual length of the spatial and temporal standards of measurement change. There is no constant unit of measurement, nor can there be. It goes with this, of course, that there is no absolute space nor absolute time. They vary with the perspective or frame of reference of the observer. The exact scientist always had previously assumed that different estimates which different observers made were due to differences in their perceptions, and existed only in their consciousnesses, not in nature. This holds not only for extents of space and time, but also for mass and any form of so-called energy. What had been considered as belonging to mind now has to be recognized as belonging to the measurable nature with which the most exact sciences are occupied. What a thing is in nature depends not simply on what it is in itself, but also upon the observer, in this case on his motion relative to the object. Now this sort of relativity of the known to the knower has played a great part in the philosophy of mind, but here is this relativity of the thing to the observer brought in by science to determine what is the nature of the thing itself. If this is true of the motion of the observer,

why may it not also be true of his sensitivity? Why can not an object in nature have color because it stands in relation to an organism endowed with vision? If the triadic relation of the thing and its quality and the observer determines the nature of the thing in exact measurement, why may it not be true down the whole line of observation? One of the most considerable problems of the relation of mind to material nature appears most unexpectedly within science itself.

Thus in scientific biology, in the study of the relation of the intelligent organism to its environment; in scientific psychology, in the study of the perceiving organism to its environment; and in relativistic physics, in the study of the relation of the observer to the observed environment, we find science doing yeoman's service in struggling with the problem of mind and nature. In this new landscape Berkeley's old principle of orientation, that mind and nature are of the same stuff, that nature exists in our perception of it, can be affirmed again with better chance of its being accepted. The scientist may, with professional pride, insist that he is not philosophizing, but as he imports more and more of that which was considered mental into his material world he has also taken over the problem of relating the two to each other, and the philosopher can only wish him Godspeed in his undertaking.

No man is wholly responsible for his own metaphysics; a large part of the structure of it he inevitably takes over from the period and the community of which he is a part. The insight, which his genius gives him, must play upon the landscape which surrounds him, but it may be an insight which illuminates more significantly other landscapes than his own. And that I think is true of Berkeley's insight that the world of our perception is the real world. When Berkeley sought to counteract the materialism of his time, by presenting perception as daily converse with God, he was met by Dr. Johnson's stamp of his foot on the pavement, by the Free Thinker's shrug of his shoulder, and by the indifference of the scientist. Today the affirmation that the real world is the world of our experience comes to us in no such bizarre form. Berkeley saw the real world partially in our perceptions, but completely in the mind of God. From this he drew the moral that we should govern our conduct by the meaning and purpose of the world, which God had revealed to us through many channels. We can not draw any such moral from the identification of our experience with reality. We possess no vision given in the mount which completes our perspectives. The moral that we can draw is of a frankly opposite sort. Just in so far as we can control our experience we can control the world, just in so far we can be creative in our own experi-

ences, we can be creative in the world. We can be thus intelligently creative only in so far as we conform to the order which is revealed in our past experience. We control nature by obeying her. And we have been doing it at a great rate. The world in which humanity lives today, especially in the western world, is as different from that of the eighteenth century as were two geologic epochs. We can determine what plant life and what animal life shall surround us; and to a large extent we do. We can determine what shall be the immediate incidence of cold and heat upon our bodies. We can determine what sort of a human race shall be bred, and how many of them. All the conditions which we believe, in large measure, determined the origin of species are within our power. We can do all of this, but we have not accepted the responsibility for it. And, I take it, this is the moral that we should draw from the identity of the world of our experience and the real world. If we can control the means we become responsible for the new ends which they enable us to form. And we have come far short of accepting that responsibility. We fashioned the marvellous world of the twentieth century, and then undertook within it to fight an eighteenth-century war. The hands were the hands of Esau, but the voice was the voice of Jacob.

Now I am no prophet to spread before you the forms which this responsibility will take, nor can any man, for that matter. But I can see that it is within our great universities that there will arise that contact of the scientific comprehension and control of the world with the needs and hopes of human society, out of which must spring both the sense and the formulation of these responsibilities. It is for this reason that it seems to me singularly appropriate that the insight and vision of the great Bishop should be associated with a great university in that America where he looked for the dawn of a new day.

GEORGE H. MEAD.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

THE LIMITS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THEIR DETERMINANTS

THE humor attaching to the profound discussions of the eighteen-nineties regarding the limits of the various social sciences is beginning to be apparent. There are no natural limits to the field of any science. That scientists have believed there were is only additional evidence of the fact that the human mind selects a viewpoint for purposes of orientation with regard to a problem or set of problems and then erects this viewpoint into an absolute, a sys-

tem inherent in nature itself. This has always been the method of human interpretation of the world, but now, under the influence of wider contacts and accumulated experience, we are learning to see the world relatively and to recognize that there are as many viewpoints or perspectives as there are problems and men to state solutions to these problems.

A problem represents, in the last analysis, an obstruction to one's behavior, physical or mental. The solution of the problem is a way out. If the solution is a practical one the way out is through overt action. If it is theoretical, the way out is a verbalization—a verbal perspective upon the tangled situation which confronts our behavior. This verbalized perspective tells us what to do. So impressive is this solution or perspective to the one whose inhibited behavior is released by it that, unless he is a person of wide experience, he is likely to think that it would be equally good and true for everyone, and if he has a strong drive for order and logic he may even insist that others also accept his solution.

Sciences are only verbalized complexes of many related solutions of similar or complementary problems. The treatise is a series or harmonized and integrated system of such verbalized solutions or perspectives. In the more advanced phases of science these verbalizations of potential behavior become highly complex, abstract, and symbolic. They do not appear to refer to the concrete behavior of anyone in particular, or even to any concrete form of collective behavior, because they are abstract and symbolical generalizations of individual and collective behavior. But the ultimate origin of these abstract sciences was in concrete personal behavior as here stated.

Before the human mind had invented highly abstract symbols and abstract integrations of them to describe the more abstract aspects of individual and collective behavior, certain concrete methods of symbolizing abstract behavior values were invented. Vico was the first to see this fact clearly. His nine years of assiduous reading of the classics in isolation, with abundant opportunity for thinking, gave him insight into the symbolical meaning of myths and mythologies. The gods, he said, were the deposits of traditional values. Each of them stood in the minds of the masses for certain types of behavior and emotion which they regarded as essential to their civilization, however little they may have been conscious of that civilization as an abstract whole. To people who are not able to see collective behavior abstractly and as a whole, who can not recognize social values in principles, the concrete embodiment of behavior values in great personalities is most valuable for their guidance. In all ages the masses of men

have been dependent upon such personalities, whether human or divine.

And because such mythologies and myths have come so completely to symbolize their individual and collective behavior values, and thus to offer them perspective in their tangled and complex social worlds, they are likely to feel that such viewpoints, or "beliefs," should be equally valuable to others. When they become aware of other mythologies or "beliefs," the very fact that these are not their own ways of seeing things, of getting perspective on their tangled maze of collective behavior, prevents them from looking upon these with that immediacy of conviction of truth which goes along only with sensory or logical experience. If, furthermore, they are logically-minded and sincere devotees to a world of order, they are likely to wish to induce, or even to compel, others to accept the same perspectives as they have, although their experiences and traditional antecedents have not been the same and therefore their mythological and verbalized perspectives can not be identical and at the same time equally vivid and real.

Mankind began to pass out of the age of the mythologies—Vico said the age of the gods—when they learned to think abstractly in terms of verbal symbolic values instead of in terms of personalities or personal behavior values. Philosophers succeeded poets and dramatizers as the formulators of accepted verbalized perspectives upon behavior. The later Greeks, in particular those of the post-Periclean age, were adepts at the new and abstract method of verbally depicting proper perspectives in behavior. Of course the masses of the people did not follow the philosophers in their new statement of the solution of behavior problems. Even yet they have not learned to do so fully, for they have not mastered adequately the behavioristic meaning of the symbols. But they are in process of development in the new direction, and some have gone even further than the Greek philosophers in the direction of the verbalization of behavior perspectives.

As the philosophers replaced the concrete imagery of the mythological beings with abstract verbal imagery, the whimsical social order imaged in the mythologies was likewise replaced, or began to be replaced, by an orderly world reflected in the concept of natural law. The natural law of the philosophers was not, as was generally supposed, a fixed order of things in the universe or some super-mythical code kept somewhere under cosmical lock and key. The new physics appears to confirm an older suspicion that the events of nature are no more logically related to one another than are the events of human history. It is man, always seeking a perspective upon things with reference to which he must act, who

has looked order into them. It was man the thinker who through the travail of his perplexed brain brought order out of the chaos of the physical world and out of the social world, or the world of collective behavior. As a mythologist or theologian he did it by creating concrete personalities to embody and make objective and real, to create his traditions. Their imputed behavior was only the most logical and socially corrected reflection of his own behavior which he could picture. As he became better able to get perspective on his collective behavior he began also to picture a higher and more ethical type of behavior in his gods. He even gave to them theories of behavior in addition to the emotions which almost exclusively characterized the earlier gods. And in time he replaced them with an impersonal verbalized system, that of natural law.

This system of natural law was but the projected epitome of his own observations and reflections about his world, disciplined by logic and integrated into principles by the philosophers. That he thought he had discovered the system of natural law, instead of having created it, was the natural result of the poverty of his knowledge of psychology and sociology and of his lack of a technique of inductive logic. With the development of a projective psychology and a creative logic the part played by man in the production of laws governing his behavior has become increasingly manifest. The recent work in relativity physics has confirmed the earlier relativity viewpoint in sociology and psychology. One can not live and act consistently and purposively without orientation. All purposive behavior is with reference to ends, and the ends are determined by the formulation of accumulated experience into guiding personalities (mythology) and guiding principles (philosophy). That early philosophy was metaphysical instead of positivistic or scientific was due to the fact that the creators of general verbalized perspectives (the philosophers) could not get the relativity viewpoint. They saw principles from the angle of tradition instead of from the angle of immediate experience.

It was science—the observational, experimental, and comparative methods—that took metaphysics out of philosophy and let relativity or inductive creative logic in. The recognition that the human mind can *know* only what it *perceives* through its senses and through logical and critical manipulation of sensory perceptions, destroyed the sacredness of tradition and replaced absolutes with relatives, for the fruits of observation and experimentation could never be complete and final. The natural law codes of the metaphysicians were replaced by hypothetical generalizations, which might achieve the value of increasing certainty only with accumulated confirmatory observations. The criterion of the value

of a generalization ceased to be its age and became the number of witnesses to the same induction from like or identical data.

If it was Vico who first saw clearly the meaning of the gods, it was Comte who first grasped clearly the meaning of metaphysical generalizations. Both of these men did much toward the development of the concept of a scientific or relativity viewpoint, and Comte may be said to have formulated the general methodology of science, although he did not himself create a special methodology for any particular science, not even for sociology. In sociology he did not advance far beyond the method of analogy. But the fact that both of these men were forerunners of sociology rather than of physics illustrates again a fact too infrequently recognized, that the relativity viewpoint originated in the field of sociology rather than in that of physics. This fact is probably the result of the greater immediacy of social behavior, while the earlier quantitative statement of relativity in physics was the result of the greater facility with which the behavior of physical objects can be measured by means of sensory standards and by standards growing relatively immediately out of sensory perceptions.

But such a contrast between the fields of physics and sociology, or between any other two sciences, should not be taken to imply that these fields are fixed and permanently delimited. Science is very young. It is more of a method as yet than a content. The method of science—that of approaching adjustment problems from the standpoint of observation, experiment, and critical comparison —was of necessity first applied to concrete problems. The more concrete the problems the more likely was the method to be applied. Some physical phenomena are especially concrete and measurable by the naked eye, that is, directly by sensory perceptions, and with relatively little logical or conceptual reorganization and correction or revision of sensory perceptions. Even the simplest collective or social phenomena require seeing more with the "mind's eye," or logical synthesis, than with the physical eye, and the process of quantitative measurement of collective human behavior is accordingly more complex than that of measuring equally elementary physical phenomena. Hence a physics or a chemistry, and even an astronomy, may reach a high degree of quantitative statement before a sociology can achieve a similar organization, just as arithmetical measurements are easier to develop than are complicated statistical ones, partly because one type of measurements is antecedent to the other.

But the initial separateness of the sciences does not persist of necessity. As life becomes more complex and as an attempt to see it in larger perspective and to control it with reference to a

more adequate system of ends or perspectives develops, all of the sciences which were formerly isolated are drawn increasingly into a unified organization. It is the problem which calls for a perspective or interpretation of successful behavior and it is likewise the organization of a field of related problems and a synthesis of perspectives or verbalized solutions which constitute a science, when such verbalized perspectives are seen or formulated from an inductive and relativity standpoint. With the growing complexity of problems, whether physical or social, it becomes increasingly necessary to secure a broader perspective of behavior as a means to their solution. Thus it is true that the legislator, the school superintendent, the preacher, must include in his managerial perspective not only facts of sociology, law, economics, and psychology, but also facts of biology, chemistry, physics, and meteorology. It is also equally true that the maker of iron or of automobiles must pay as much attention to psychology, economics, and sociology as to physics, chemistry, and bacteriology, if he wishes to get the iron or automobiles made.

But here we are dealing with the arts rather than with the pure sciences. Could the same be said of the sociologist and of the physicist? Do not their subjects remain distinct, perhaps acquire greater distinctness, as new specialties and sub-sciences split off from the older general sciences? We must be careful here to distinguish between the fields of specialists working in any particular science or group of sciences and the sciences themselves. The specialists may concentrate upon increasingly narrower fields and problems, for the sake of efficiency, calling upon other specialists for aid and counsel when they approach the limits of their particular problems and encroach upon other territory. But the science itself is constantly extending its boundaries. Just as the sciences were originally integrated out of sets of related verbalized perspectives on sets of related problems, harmonized and reduced to inner logical consistency, so have the fields of the several sciences grown by the accretion of new related verbalized perspectives on contiguous theoretical problems. Sciences are but logically harmonized and integrated verbalizations of perspectives. They are essentially federal in principle, approaching integration as their verbalizations become increasingly general and abstract and symbolical.

It is not surprising, therefore, that this process of accretion should go on until the sciences should encroach upon one another. This is what was happening in the 'nineties, when there was so much controversy regarding the proper limits of fields. If the motivation then was primarily administrative and personal, rather

than theoretical, and if the theory (mostly untenable) was but a rationalization of personal and administrative ambitions, this fact only serves to illustrate the induction that the social sciences at least have lost much of their distinctness of fields. The same overlapping is found among the physical and chemical sciences, and among the biological and psychological sciences. It is only at the extremes, as between the physical and the social sciences, that it is still easy to distinguish the territories of the sciences. Those sciences that lie closest to each other in the Comtean and Spencerian classifications now overlap and their subject-matters can not any longer easily be discriminated. This is true of sociology and psychology. Here the overlapping territority is being organized into a new science of social psychology. In a like manner a science of social biology is being created out of the overlapping territory between biology and sociology. In a similar way psychology and biology overlap, giving rise to a number of derivative sciences, such as neurology, physiological psychology, behavior, and psychiatry. There are also now sciences of biological chemistry and physical chemistry. The examples could be greatly multiplied and particularized by further analysis into derivative and subderivative sciences, most of which are the outgrowth of two or more overlapping sciences rather than of a single science.

If we limit our attention to the social sciences and the sciences most closely related to them we find an almost impenetrable confusion of overlapping new derivative sciences which preëmpt portions of the fields formerly occupied exclusively by the older general sciences, or, more often perhaps, the intermediate territory not formerly covered by them. Thus most of the new sciences are in a sense compromise sciences, and not infrequently they bear evidence of this fact in their hybrid names. They have arisen to verbalize new integrations or perspectives of theoretical problem situations developing in between the old general sciences, and overlapping with them. This tendency toward the creation of new derivative and hybrid sub-sciences will doubtless become more marked in the future than it has been in the past. It is a necessary process due to the fact that the human mind can not grasp the whole field of science as a unit. It can not as yet get a complete synthesis of theoretical adjustment perspectives, and it probably never will be able to do so, since the very nature of a problem situation, whether in life or in abstract theory, is that it emphasizes, for the time being, one aspect of adjustment or maladjustment more than the others. Thus sciences grow up around these practical or theoretical adjustment situations as larger integrations of verbalized perspectives upon the phenomena or symbols of

phenomena concerned. But the ability of the scientist to get a general perspective of the whole field of behavior and symbolical adjustment content which constitutes the subject-matter of the various sciences increases as these several derivative sciences fill out the territory between the fields of the old general sciences and as the several fields of the sciences are themselves extended logically. This widening perspective is sometimes called simply science, and at other times the philosophy of science. It has a peculiar relation to sociology in that one of the functions of sociology is to see human adjustment relations, whether concrete and practical or abstract and symbolical, in as wide a perspective as possible.

This last function of sociology does not, however, constitute it a science of the sciences, as some earlier writers supposed, except in the sense that all sciences must in one of their aspects be sciences of the sciences, i.e., must conceive their theoretical problems in the light of the mutually conditioning factors that are common to them and the other sciences. In this sense all sciences, by virtue of the very fact of their growth in scope, tend to become sciences of the sciences. But this tendency is, as we have implied, in some degree checked by the development of derivative overlapping and interstitial sciences.

There are, therefore, no limits to any science except those placed by the nature of the problems (practical or theoretical) upon which verbalized perspective is sought and secured, on the one hand, and by administrative convenience and competitive strength, on the other hand. This has always been the case. If in the early history of the sciences they appeared to be logically distinct and fully separated, it was because problem complexes to be verbalized into explanatory perspectives were as yet relatively few and far between, like occasional trees in a plain. Life was relatively simple and the sciences also were accordingly more detached and distinguishable. The names and the fields of the sciences are as accidental as the occurrence of these problem complexes to be verbalized. If history had been different, the sciences also would have been different. They were not determined in content and in scope "from the foundation of the world," later to be "discovered" by means of a peeling-off process of logic which thus laid bare the intellectual skeleton or framework of the universe. This is the metaphysical conception of the universe closely akin to the old concept of natural law, which has now been discarded. As we have learned to get perspective upon the history and relations of the sciences, just as they also constitute perspective upon their subject-matter of practical or theoretical problems, we have discovered that all sciences are but man's ways of looking at his ad-

justment problems, however abstract and symbolical and derivative those problems and the scientific perspectives or verbalizations of adjustment procedures relating to them have become. They are human inventions, human tools, human culture, and not original nature.

Then are there any defensible limits to any science, to sociology? Yes, those of convention and those of convenience. History (convention) can not be made over in a day. The names and the content of the sciences are historical facts, subject constantly to modification by convenience, when common sense can make headway against custom and tradition. The sciences do change subject-matter and method constantly. All of the social disciplines today, including even history, are moving rapidly in the direction of an emphasis upon sociological content on the one hand and in the direction of inductive generalization from contemporaneous facts on the other. Also the limitations upon power and breadth of perspective tend in some degree to keep the sciences in their historical places, while expansion of subject-matter and of perspective is largely taken care of by the development of new derivative and hybrid sciences, with new names, which may or may not indicate their relationship with the older sciences. But the point of importance here is that names, scope, and content of the sciences are not fixed by some predetermined natural law. They are rather the products of history and are modifiable by intelligence under the pressure of the need for new perspectives. Consequently, any fruitful discussion of the scope and content of the sciences, including sociology, must necessarily be in terms of the history and the functions of the sciences rather than in terms of metaphysics or aprioristic logic. There is no copyright upon facts in the economy of the sciences. Any science has clear title to any fact if it can use that fact in establishing a better perspective of the symbolical adjustments which it is the business of the science to verbalize.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA. L. L. BERNARD.

BOOK REVIEWS

Locke Selections. Edited by STERLING P. LAMPRECHT. (Modern Student's Library.) New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1928. li + 349 pp.

Teachers of philosophy are condemned by the nature of the subject to struggle with the problem of texts. Because philosophy is always partly an art, it is desirable that students should read the works of the great masters as they were originally written. But the condition of education at the present time makes this impossible as

a general rule. It is necessary to fall back on either a volume of selections from all the philosophers or different volumes giving selections from individual writers.

Of these the latter is certainly the better plan. Nobody who is honest pretends to read all that is written by every philosopher, nor to be interested equally in all of them. The volumes in the Modern Student's Library leave the intelligent student no excuse for not acquiring a collection of texts which are authentic as material and adequate for general purposes. Locke is a particularly good example. As the edition of the *Essay* by A. S. Pringle-Pattison demonstrated, the repetitions in that work can be cut out with no loss to philosophy or literature. But the practical problem is to make the student realize that Locke was not an academic teacher, interested only in demonstrating a new way of ideas. Politics and religion and education and medicine and natural science were some of the interests which filled his days. As Professor Lamprecht points out, "the perennial interest of Locke's writings is largely due to the contact of his thinking with the realities of social life in one of the most creative periods of English history." With this in mind Professor Lamprecht has arranged his selections so that the student will come to the *Essay* and its theory of knowledge through a suitable avenue of social and political topics. An introduction gives sufficient description of Locke's way of living and a useful review of his mental development. Locke seems never to have been in a hurry and we may reasonably suppose that this fact explains both the charm and the permanence of his work. Under the title "General Philosophical Position" the editor has collected specimens of Locke's views on education, religion, the art of thinking, toleration, and political liberalism. These extracts occupy 80 pages, after which another selection of 260 pages presents the doctrine of the *Essay*. On the whole the selection of passages is commendable, assuming that the editor was limited by the rules of the series. But the usefulness of the book is diminished by putting all the references in a table (p. XLIX). The reference to the source should have been put on the page where the selection appears. Thus "Liberalism in Politics" represents passages from "*Treatise of Civil Government.*" But the work as quoted on the previous page is *Two Treatises of Government*, which is likely to confuse the student, and something is lost by giving no specimen of the skilful irony which Locke used to destroy the dogmatism of Filmer. Also the advantages of an index are not fully supplied by the table of selections. Apart from these minor points the book is well prepared and will prove as useful to other teachers as it has been already to myself.

G. S. Brett.

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A History of Modern Philosophy. H. W. DRESSER. New York: T. Y. Crowell Co. 1928. Pp. viii + 471.

Thanks to the remorseless process of time, the history of philosophy can always be rewritten with some change of perspective and some additions. This book continues the author's work on *Ancient and Mediæval Philosophy.* It begins with Francis Bacon and ends with Realism and the New Rationalism. For the trained philosopher interest naturally centres on the last part and some excitement can be derived from seeing how the author will manipulate the recent additions to the historical roll. Making proper allowance for limitations, the effort may be called successful. The section on Croce, for example, is a very commendable achievement; American Philosophy of the Royce-James period is treated with fairness; the Realists conclude the procession and furnish a text for the epilogue.

Recent events have given some cause for reflecting on the most useful way of dealing with historical philosophy. For popular appeal the method of Durant seems to have proved its value: the author can take what he likes and leave the rest in outer darkness. For teaching purposes this method is troublesome because it needs too much supplementing. The other method is the encyclopædic way, which requires many volumes and attracts few readers. Perhaps there is a golden mean, and perhaps this is what Dr. Dresser hoped to achieve. He has certainly succeeded in naming most of the important people and some of the unimportant. Such an item as "Thomas Morgan (d. 1743), *The Moral Philosopher*" seems to occupy space unnecessarily. On the other hand, Malebranche was worth more than nineteen lines, especially as the lines give no suggestion of the real vitality of Malebranche's work. Occasionally the writing degenerates into a mere catalogue of names: sixteen writers are indicated as having "also run" on pp. 373–4. In some recent histories there has been a tendency to exalt the importance of the sciences as the real roots of progress in philosophy. Dr. Dresser introduces the great names, such as Galileo, Newton, and Darwin: but the reader will not easily discover why they deserve mention. The section on Hobbes, for example, just fails to give the connecting link with Galileo because it also fails to give the exact method which Hobbes carefully describes. If we turn over to the section on Wundt we find the "folk-psychology" practically ignored. The author might claim that his history was limited to philosophy: but the physiological psychology comes in and the social psychology is indispensable for understanding the expansion of Wundt's thought.

In spite of these complaints the reviewer has found the book well adapted for classroom use. It presents a large amount of information conveniently and provides a good basis for exposition. It is

well printed, with very few errors. The statement "No motion occurs at a distance" (p. 32) is curious. On p. 86 *Fame* should be *Frame*. On p. 357 Fourrier is presumably Fourier.

G. S. BRETT.

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

Luc de Clapiers, Marquis de Vauvenargues. MAY WALLAS. London. Cambridge University Press. 1928. Pp. viii + 308.

This handsomely-printed volume is an expansion of a thesis for the Ph.D. degree of London University. While it approaches the character of a "Life and Thought of Vauvenargues," it is primarily a thorough and competent piece of scholarship, making no compromise with the reader who is ignorant of French, even to the extent of translating quotations from that language. As such, it is an immense relief from the slipshod "biographies" so much in vogue among us. The book concerns a man who, on any of the usual scales of importance, must be recorded as a minor figure of eighteenth-century French thought. There is more than a grain of truth in Mr. Aldous Huxley's recent charge that the average thesis "deals almost always with some humanly insignificant fact or person. Inevitably: for all the significant facts and people have been written about. . ." At the same time we have so few competent studies in English of minor continental thinkers, that Miss Wallas may be pardoned for lavishing upon Vauvenargues a degree of scholarly insight and industry which would have befitted a far greater hero.

Vauvenargues, thanks to the confused and incomplete character of his published works, eludes classification as a thinker, but not as a man. He is one of a number of the Provençal *petite noblesse* of his century, who were irked by their obscurity, and sought to escape from it by courting literary fame (while in the Army or the Church) as amateur *moralistes,* composing general reflections about life after the popular models, and corresponding with the luminaries of the dawning Enlightenment. Among these gentlemen, the key to whose lives is the Gallic thirst for *la gloire,* Vauvenargues distinguished himself in a number of ways. First of all, thanks to frost-bite on the retreat from Prague, and a severe siege of smallpox, he lived only for the brief span of thirty-two years. Even more remarkable,—he became and remained for the last five years of his life in "an age of jealousies and quarrels" the very good friend of Voltaire. And lastly, he did manage, by sheer courage, to snatch from the grasp of death and oblivion enough fragments of the literary fame for which he lusted, to bring himself down to the present.

Neither a philosopher nor a *philosophe,* Vauvenargues presents no ordered system of ideas, even in the fields of ethics and psychology,

which he chiefly cultivated. He was an acute observer of men, and a clever imitator of style. He was quick to learn the current tricks of the epigrammatists, and to use them against the two contrasting excesses of his era: severity and frivolity. Posing as a neutral between the warring Churchmen and free-thinkers of the time, Vauvenargues himself preached nothing more definite than an uncertain Stoicism tempered by a lingering distaste for the austerity of his own upbringing. In the author's words: "His whole life was spent in an interval of doubt and disillusion; and his attitude, both to the old ideas and to what he understood of the new, was in the main hostile and critical." Dimly and quite without knowing it, he foreshadowed the new liberty that he did not live to detest.

Just as Vauvenargues, for all his penetrating insight and leonine courage, failed to achieve a philosophy, so his biographer is weakest in dealing with the philosophical aspects of his thought. Her account of his relation to Locke is especially open to criticism, and her modest claims of originality for some of Vauvenargues' maxims will hardly bear close scrutiny in the light of earlier French moralizing. American writers are so accustomed to being scolded by English critics for their short, journalistic paragraphs that one may be pardoned for calling attention to the abundance of one-sentence paragraphs used in this case by an English author. In other respects, and they are many, Miss Wallas has produced a splendid and a lastingly useful book.

HAROLD A. LARRABEE.

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Feelings and Emotions. The Wittenborg Symposium by Thirty-four Authors. Edited by MARTIN L. REYMERT. Worcester: Clark University Press. 1928. Pp. xvi + 454.

The reader may well approach this book with high expectations. First to strike his attention is an alluring title, set off in letters of gold on a background of red. Beneath the cover his eyes may feast on a roster of distinguished authors, thirty-four in number, all scientists of note. If he pages further he is brought into an interesting album, containing photographs of all who contributed to the preparation of the volume. No book could introduce itself under more favorable auspices. If the reader is disappointed in the end perhaps it is because he expected too much.

The book contains thirty-four chapters, one for each of its authors. In addition there is an appendix containing transcripts of addresses given at the occasion of the Symposium, namely, the inauguration of a new psychological laboratory at Wittenberg College. To enter into a review of each of the thirty-four contribu-

tions would be too extensive an enterprise, and would entail the hazard of making comparisons between authors. A brief comment on the main contents will have to suffice.

The material of the book falls under eight general headings. The first part, entitled "General Problems in the Psychology of Feeling and Emotion," includes thirteen chapters and is the most lengthy portion of the volume. A second part, consisting of eight chapters, is captioned "Special Problems in the Psychology of Feeling and Emotion." Following this is a section devoted to the physiology of feeling and emotion; this part contains three chapters, one of which, contributed by W. B. Cannon, is perhaps the most instructive chapter of the book. A part is devoted to "Pathology and Psychoanalysis of Feeling and Emotion": the three chapters which belong here are well advised, but fall far short of a comprehensive treatment of this field. A section is devoted to feeling and emotion in children: it contains only two chapters, both well written, but so fragmentary as to provide but little insight into the emotional life of the child. A sixth part gives observations on esthetics and religion; a seventh contains a chapter on the historical development of emotional theory. The eighth and final part presents a chapter on the training of emotions.

Each of the thirty-four contributions bears the stamp of scholarship and is written on a high level of understanding. Graduate students and academic psychologists will find all the chapters instructive and worth-while. For theoretical orientation, for an introduction to academic points of view, for an insight into the problems that arise in the systematic interpretation of the emotions, the book leaves little to be desired.

It is not what the book contains, but rather what it omits, that gives rise to disappointment. Each chapter that is offered might well serve as a skeletal outline for further illuminating discussion. The general framework for a discourse on the affective life is there. But the lumber and bricks are missing.

Perhaps this feature of the book is one of deliberate design; perhaps it is a necessary consequence of the limitations of space imposed on each writer. But the fact remains that the book scarcely scratches the surface of the rich and fascinating field of human affections. The uninitiated reader might well ask to discover in a book of this title something concerning the intimate events of his private experience; to find a portrayal of the origin, course, and possible control of his fears, loves, jealousies, sorrows, joys, and countless other affective conditions. He may be puzzled over the general problem of human motivation; and desire enlightenment concerning emotional conflicts, repressions, compul-

sions, cravings, and strivings. He would like to find these conditions depicted for him by artists gifted with an insight into human nature, versed in the experimental literature, and possessed of a capacity for rendering articulate that which others dimly perceive.

If the book fails to satisfy this ambitious requirement the failure can not be charged entirely to the limitations of our knowledge of the emotions. Much can be learned from studies reported on the relation between the endocrine glands and the emotions: yet this field of research is given no specific treatment in the book. There is a wealth of literature dealing with observations of expressive reactions, changes in blood pressure and blood volume, changes in visceral tone, behavior of striped and unstriped muscles, and electrical phenomena of the skin under emotional stimulation; yet no chapter of the book is devoted to a summary and criticism of the contents and results of these studies. There is no thorough treatment of the emotions of childhood, or of the rôle of emotion in the causation of delinquency, neurosis, and pathological states.

Psychologists will welcome this book as a guide to the general problem of the emotions, and as an introduction into some of the topics with which a psychology of the feelings and emotions must deal. But the book can not be regarded as a cross section of modern research in the field of the emotions, nor as an adequate review of the information already at hand.

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

Freedom in the Modern World. Edited by HORACE M. KALLEN. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc. 1928. xii + 304 pp.

This is a series of lectures delivered at the New School for Social Research in 1928. The preface and the introductory essay by the editor point to the freedom in which each of the contributors has written and to the shifting currents which make old definitions of freedom ill fitted to the present. He declares that no freedom of acquiescence will satisfy the modern demand—"it would rather slow up the world-machine than exercise no influence whatever upon it" (p. 6). This dramatizes the philosophical problem of freedom by the personification of evil in a king, a priest, or "big business." It is a fighting freedom that he demands—but is fighting freedom? By the same token that the "interests" are partisan, so are the fighters against them. It is abundantly clear even in the opening essay that what is one man's freedom is another man's bondage. Why not then openly avow the class war by the admission that fighting freedom is the philosophical apotheosis of power?

The essays are of very unequal value. Some of them are unde-

niably the products of highly civilized and intricate minds while others are marked by superficiality. The essays on "Liberty and Law" by Chafee; "Freedom of Speech, Conscience, and the Press" by Bent; "Freedom in the Fine Arts" by Lovett; and "Freedom and Psychology" by Jastrow would excuse the publication of some of the others. Dewey's contribution called "Philosophies of Freedom" gives us Dewey at his best. His analysis of the aspects of freedom, including a surprisingly lucid and brief exposition of Spinoza's conception of freedom, seems to me to be near the top of his philosophical writing. His synthesis of these abstract aspects is the familiar doctrine which we have all come to associate with Dewey, but here also there is a clarity of style and a force of expression which he has not always reached. Hardly a better definition of his position can be found than that revealed in his declaration that "freedom resides in the development of preferences into intelligent choices" (p. 267). If the series of lectures could have been turned into a symposium on the basis of such precision as Dewey contributes, it might not be necessary for the reviewer to add a negative criticism. In such a case we might have been spared the parts written on the assumption that freedom is freedom *from* something rather than freedom *in* a universe. Protest against this or that annoyance felt by active individuals in a physical and social world is not out of place in human life, although it can hardly be a significant step in the business of philosophy. What philosophy needs is a penetration beneath the flux of an irritating world to the bed-rock concept of freedom through conflict and distraction within the soul itself. The problem of freedom would be as easy as Mill's formula if an individual knew what he wanted at any time and place. Freedom might then be freedom "to do what I want to do." But in our world the real crisis comes in that infinite span between preferences and intelligent choices. So stated, who shall say that censorship in general should be relaxed or that sumptuary laws in general should be avoided? The perpetual battle of freedom is in the hazardous experimentation destined to show (perhaps after it is too late) whether or not the particular restraint aids and abets the emergence of "intelligent choices."

But a reviewer is not asked to revise a book. For good or for ill in philosophical clarification this series of essays is at least an index to the lexicon of contemporary dispute about certain social policies. It rewards the reader by reminding him that he is a contemporary and that the issues of freedom do not get settled by phrases, but by the hazards of being contemporary.

The contribution to the subject made by those chosen to speak for the churches is curiously out of joint with the main body of the

book. If greatly extended, this portion might have been more significant, but as it stands one could almost believe that religion is no longer interested in freedom. Has the church forgotten its devotion to lost causes? Where is the Christian martyr?

H. G. TOWNSEND.

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON.

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Scheller, Emil J.: Grundlagen der Erkenntnislehre bei Gratry. (Forschungen zur Neuren Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, herausgegeben von Hans Meyer, III.) Halle (Salle): Max Niemeyer. 1929. xv + 288 pp. 14 M.

Salditt, Maria: Hegels Shakespeare Interpretation. Berlin: Julius Springer. 1927. Pp. 46. (This brochure constitutes number 5 of the series entitled *Philosophische Forschungen,* edited by Professor Karl Jasper of Heidelberg. It is noteworthy only as an illustration of the excess to which the Hegel renaissance in contemporary Germany has gone. A few casual illustrative references to Shakespeare in Hegel's works are given a philosophical padding by arbitrary citations from the *Logic* and then dished up as a consistent and conscious, if not systematic, interpretation of Shakespeare. Hegel's interpretation is then corrected by the author's own philosophical interpretation of Shakespeare, which, if anything, is

even more uncontrolled. In the *Logic* Hegel had said "not the finite is real, but the infinite" and in the *Lectures on Aesthetics* he refers to Shakespeare's characters as having only a formal isolated individuality not representing the highest form of tragedy. Dr. Salditt takes exception to both Hegel's conception of individuality and this interpretation of Shakespeare. She should have, therefore, taken as her theme either Hegel's conception of individuality or of tragedy. But what is offered here is a very strange contribution to philosophical research, indeed. S. H.)

NOTES AND NEWS

A new philosophical journal, *Der Russische Gedanke, internationale Zeitschrift für russische Philosophie, Literaturwissenschaft und Kulture,* has recently appeared. I. Jahrgang, I. Heft, is dated 1929. It is edited by Boris Jakowenko, Marienbad, Kasinoparkstrasse, Villa Friedrichsruh, Czechoslovakia, and published by the Verlag von Friedrich Cohen, Bonn, Germany. Three numbers constitute an annual volume; subscription price, ten marks.

An editorial note states as the three chief aims of the journal: first, to serve as a common ground and European tribune for Russian thinkers of all schools without distinction; secondly, to treat the problems of the history of Russian thought and civilization for non-Russians; and thirdly, to announce and review new publications in the field of Russian thought and new Russian and foreign books devoted to Russian thought and Russia.

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Volume XXVI. No. 11. May 23, 1929.

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